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A PECULIAR MODE OF EXPRESSION
Judge Doe's Use of the Distinction
Between Law and Fact'
JOHN REID*
Judicial fame has been a fleeting thing in American legal history.
Pursued by many, it has come to few. The touchstones for determin-
ing the qualities a judge must show to outlive his own epoch and
influence the generations which follow him have never been deter-
mined by the historiographers of our law. An examination of the
career of Gibson of Pennsylvania might lead the casual observer to
suggest the secret lies in dominating and molding the jurisprudence
of a single state. But then why is Lumpkin of Georgia forgotten by
all but the lawyers of his jurisdiction? Others might look at Cooley
of Michigan and say the answer is extra-judicial activities, such as
treatise writing. But what of Redfield of Vermont who was re-
markably prolific for his own times? To say that Shaw of Mas-
sachusetts is remembered because his long tenure gave him time to
build, block by block, whole areas of emerging law during the In-
dustrial Revolution, would be to ignore the fact that the even longer
service of Beasley of New Jersey is remembered by few scholars.
And to suggest the lasting reputation of Doe of New Hampshire rests
on his renown as a reformer, is to overlook the fact that during the
nineteenth century Appleton of Maine was regarded as the judge who
best preached the gospel of reform.
Since the present state of our legal history makes it meaningless to
compare the individual characteristics of such men, as so few have
been the subject of formal study, the answer to why the reputations
of some have outlasted others must be found in the sources which have
perpetuated those reputations. That is, in the more general works
such as those written by Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn, which
explore, with kaleidoscopic perspective, the mutable and variegated
aspects of law, both past and present. It is in these books, in their
texts and more frequently in their footnotes, referred to as examples
of what has been accomplished or cited as analogies for what can be
done, that the same names-Gibson, Shaw, Doe and a very few others
-reappear with some frequency. Their use gives the impression they
earned remembrance not alone by the originality of their genius, the
* Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. The research on this paper was carried out under a grant by the William
Nelson Cromwell Foundation of New York City.
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pungency of their language, or the value of their service to a single
jurisdiction, but more significantly because they cut a figure across
the entire common law and left their mark on many facets of Ameri-
can jurisprudence. It was with this test, unconsciously applied, that
history separated the reputations of Gibson from Jeremiah Black,
Shaw from Theophilus Parsons, and Doe from Jeremiah Smith.
How Gibson, Shaw, and Doe managed to be so versatile is a question
which has seldom been asked. Of course there are many factors, such
as long tenure, which have to be considered. But transcending the
common equation and locating the more basic explanation in in-
dividual cases is somewhat risky. For Shaw and Gibson it is not
difficult to offer a tentative, educated guess based on historical
analysis. They served in large, industrial states during the formative
era of American legal principles, when railroads and business cor-
porations were new experiments and litigation, moving into un-
precedented areas of conflict, was posing novel questions for settle-
ment. Deciding issues of momentous importance as matters of first
impression, and speaking for prestigious jurisdictions, their opinions
were bound to form the foundation for developing doctrine in many
areas of the law.
With Charles Doe of New Hampshire the explanation is more
elusive. He came along at a different period and spent his entire
career on a small, relatively insignificant bench.2 By his time the law
was fairly well settled. The formative era was over and the age of
reform lay in the future. He received few cases of first impression
and the economy of New Hampshire was not geared to present him
with the hard-core stuff from which the common law is made or even
with run-of-the-mill issues in any great variety. The secret of how
Doe, despite these drawbacks, played the gamut of legal institutions
and left an indelible stamp on many different areas of law, lies in his
mastery of the common-law technique.
Although, as Dean Wigmore suggests, Chief Justice Doe probably
never constructed a system of general principles on the higher levels
of jurisprudence,3 there have been very few judges who have had a
firmer grasp on the workings of the common law or have known
better how to manipulate its doctrines and rules. He had an intuition
for developing its strengths and seizing upon its weaknesses; to make
those challenging his views debate issues along lines he set down. As
Dean Pound pointed out, Doe combined "sound legal instincts" with a
2. Doe was appointed (at the age of 29) a few months before Shaw retired.
For the highlights of Doe's life and work see Note, Doe of New Hampshire: Re-
flections on a Nineteenth Century Judge, 63 HARv. L. Rzv. 513 (1950).
3. Wigmore, Mr. Justice Holmes, in MR. JUSTICE HOLM ES 212-13 (Frankfurter
ed. 1931).
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"thorough knowledge of traditional legal methods, '' 4 and this per-
mitted him, even when advancing radical ideas, to force opponents on
the defensive.5 By giving close study to pedestrian matters which
few judges of his intellectual curiosity would have detained, he not
only learned to master basic common-law tools such as the distinction
between law and fact, but became convinced that the unity of legal
science could be effected more by procedural and evidentiary rules than
by elusive, abstract principles of jurisprudence.
Lord Coke believed that jurisdiction over common pleas was the
"lock and key" of the common law. Judge Doe found his lock and key
in the more subtle distinction between law and fact. From the
familiar principle that matters of law are for the court and questions
of fact are for the triers of fact, he spun the theory which became
the central theme behind most of his reforms, using it to forge a
unity of judicial science in New Hampshire practice and making it
the leverage with which he exerted his greatest impact upon Ameri-
can law in general. With it he opened many doors which had been
closed for decades. With it he swept the law clear of unreasonable
rules. And with it he transcended fact patterns devoid of reform-
inspiring questions and brought renewed life to many areas of the
common law by furnishing jurists a fresh vantage point from which
to view them.
Judge Doe stumbled upon his theory concerning the distinction
between law and fact by studying legal history. He realized its value
in American jurisprudence when he noticed how his colleagues in
other jurisdictions were misapplying it. And he reinforced its sig-
nificance as a reforming tool by making it a constitutional dogma.
Doe's historical theory was simple enough. "The law," he said, "is
burdened and obscured by a great mass of common opinion, general
understanding, practice, precedent, and authority.., that has passed
for law, but is in truth not law, but fact, coming down to us largely
by descent from the ancient custom of the judge giving the jury his
opinion of the evidence." 6 Nescience of the early English jury system,
Doe believed, caused the trouble. Later judges, who made declarations
of law on questions which properly were matters of fact, had not
understood that in the precedents upon which they relied, the court,
as had been proper when its sphere was "latitudiarian,'1 had given
to the triers of fact its conclusions and suggestions on factual issues,
without explaining that these were mere opinions and not expressions
4. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 139 (1923).
5. Reid, The Reformer and the Precisian: A Study in Judicial Attitudes, 12 J.
LEGAL ED. 157 (1959).
6. State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 522 (1869).
7. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 438 (1870).
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of law the jury was bound to follow." Moreover, they had failed to
consider the changing role of the jury, and had accepted as immutable
rules of law legal presumptions and technicalities laid down by judges
responding to institutions which no longer existed. What value, he
asked, were rules of evidence and statements of law designed to
temper conditions when new trials were not permitted, or prisoners
were not allowed the assistance of counsel in relation to matters of
fact, or juries were punished at the discretion of the court for return-
ing verdicts contrary to instructions9 or when areas of English law
were administered by non-common law courts without juries,o or
when the courts excluded the testimony of parties?" In those times
judges had not hesitated, "by legal presumptions and other measures,
to extensively control the jury in the decision of questions of fact."12
Yet, despite changed circumstances and new theories concerning the
jury's function, American courts persisted in following these prece-
dents to such an extent they had "practically buried or obliterated the
dividing line between law and fact," creating "great difficulties" for
reformers like himself who endeavored "to make partition of what
had so long been held in common and undivided, thoroughly com-
mingled and blended together."13
Chief Justice Doe's sensitive probing of the common-law system
was not limited to lessons drawn from legal history. He was as
skillful handling situations involving modern juries. One of his most
telling arguments was drawn from English libel cases, commonly
regarded as an exception to the general rule. "Unfortunate" was
how he described this exception, because it opened the door to several
others, and courts had "claimed the presumption of unlawful intent
to be a matter of law in cases in which it was a matter of fact, and
juries were invited to render verdicts in open defiance of the express
directions of the court; and the distinction between law and fact was
confounded worse than ever."' 4
Just as he had with legal institutions long since abandoned, Chief
Justice Doe warned against recent innovations which tended "to
obscure the distinction between law and fact," such as the "modern
practice of trying common law cases by judge without a jury, and the
habit of inferring facts from an agreed statement of facts submitted
8. State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 520-21 (1869).
9. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 437-38 (1870).
10. Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N.H. 553, 581 (1870).
11. Savings-Bank v. Getchell, 59 N.H. 281, 286 (1879).
12. Ibid.
13. State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 521 (1869).
14. Id. at 520.
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to the court.1 15 He overlooked little, even criticizing reported cases
which failed to make the distinction clear. It was not enough, he
said, for a court to correctly treat a factual issue as a question of fact.
It must expressly state that its conclusion was a conclusion of fact,
or else there might be confusion."8 Doe apparently thought nineteenth-
century lawyers had a conditioned reflex for turning fact into law,
and, by digging deeply into his reservoir of common-law polemics, he
offered some rather convincing proof.
In one English case the trial judge instructed the jury that when a
common carrier takes into its care a parcel directed to a specified
place and does not, by positive agreement, limit its responsibility to
part of the distance, it is prima facie evidence of a contract to carry
the parcel to the point of its ultimate destination. By this the English
judge had meant "that the evidence was prima, facie evidence of the
fact and not that a legal presumption existed." But the reporters who
drafted the case's headnote wrote, "Held, that the Lancaster and
Preston Railway Company were liable for the loss." As a result one
treatise reported "it was held that the company were [sic] liable for
the loss," from which, Doe suggested, "the reader would understand
that it was so held by the court." In other words, that the court had
ruled there was a legal presumption that the parties had intended to
make a contract binding the defendant to carry the parcel to its place
of destination. The reporters should have said, "Held, by the jury,
that the company were [sic] liable. Held, by the court, that there was
evidence competent to be submitted to the jury." That, Doe thought,
would have been "a correct and useful statement of the case."
Through mistakes such as this "a plain question of fact may in-
advertently be changed into a question of law."' 7 And as Doe saw it,
the common law needed only one mistake to start a chain reaction.
"One precedent is held to justify another. Every matter of fact turned
into law opens the way for further annexation of the province of
the jury to the province of the court, and a gradual absorption."':"
This was the danger. Misunderstanding of common-law theory and
misapplication of common-law precedents combined with the lax
discipline of a cursory bench and bar "to allow settled fact to grow
into law.'119 This not only made a mockery of the jury system but
undermined the very foundations of the common law itself. As was
15. Gray v. Jackson, 51 N.H. 9, 12-15 (1871). Of course, findings of fact made
by a referee fell under the same category Holnan v. Manning, 65 N.H. 92, 18
Atl. 746 (1889).
16. Colburn v. Groton, 66 N.H. 151, 157, 28 Atl. 95, 98 (1889)
17. Gray v. Jackson, 51 N.H. 9, 12-15 (1871).
18. State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 524-25 (1869).
19. Gray v. Jackson, 51 N.H. 9, 23 (1871).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
his wont when bearding professional patterns of thought, however,
Judge Doe knew better than to rest his notions about law and fact on
common-law theories alone. He turned to the constitution for support,
claiming it unconstitutional to give certain inferences of fact the force
of law20 or to convert a presumption of fact into a presumption of
law.21 He even went so far as to claim the "constitutional view" was
conclusive, and with Judge Doe, a constitutional dogma, once asserted,
became an absolute which, when used in argument, permitted no
exceptions:
If the court may invade the province of the jury at one point, they
may invade it at all points. If they can appropriate a part of it,
they can appropriate the whole, and, uniting the office of judge
and jury, which the constitution has divided, destroy the check
and balance which have been deemed essential to the judicial
branch of a free government. 22
Although the Chief Justice placed his theory concerning the dis-
tinction between law and fact on a constitutional basis, no one
familiar with his judicial method would suggest that the theory
originated in constitutional philosophy. Rather, he concocted the
constitutional argument to buttress the question-of-fact theory. The
theory was the tail that wagged the constitutional dog.
One of the most interesting, though perhaps least consequential,
results of Chief Justice Doe's theory concerning the distinction be-
tween law and fact was that it furnished him with a new way of
looking at the function of appellate courts. This was natural enough.
If any legal institution is likely to ignore the distinction between law
and fact it is the judiciary, which has both the practical opportunity
and the professional impulse to encroach upon the province of the
triers of fact. Since Doe was determined to revitalize the theory of
law and fact, it followed that he would have to challenge the appellate
powers responsible for most of the encroachments. He probably
realized that if he directly attacked judicial prerogatives he might
alienate many judges before he had a chance to convince them, and
so he circumvented the question by phrasing his criticism in a termi-
nology less likely to offend.
While young, Doe, like most other lawyers, had been in the habit
of referring to the "discretion" of the court.2 3 Eventually the expres-
sion began to rankle him. He thought it unfortunate,2 4 apparently
20. Kendall v. Green, 67 N.H. 557, 561, 42 Atl. 178, 179 (1893).
21. State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 522-25 (1869).
22. Gray v. Jackson, 51 N.H. 9, 37 (1871).
23. E.g., the second opinion he ever wrote. Pittsfield Bank v. Clough, 39 N.H.
212, 213 (1859).
24. Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N.H. 401, 408 (1872).
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because it smacked of arbitrary power 25 and confused ministerial with
judicial error.26 One of its practical consequences had been to obscure
the rules governing the relevancy of evidence. 27 Because discretionary
power "is exercised by weighing evidence on a question of fact,"28
and, "in its technical legal sense, is the name of the decision of certain
questions of fact by the court, ' 29 he thought that matters within the
court's discretion should be called questions of fact, especially since
there is "no appeal and no power of revising the decision." 30 Around
1872 he stopped using the word in his opinions, 31 and thereafter
almost invariably referred to as "questions of fact" what other judges
termed "judicial discretion."
This was more than a mere switch in nomenclature. For if the
expression "discretion of the trial court" conjured up the idea of
arbitrariness which appellate judges were duty bound to confine
within definite limits by formulating rules and presumptions, then the
expression "question of fact" implied a decision which should be
unfettered by judicial restraints-or so Chief Justice Doe hoped. As
his court said, speaking of the admissibility of a confession (which is
a question of fact for the trial judge in New Hampshire), the "finding
upon this question is a finality as much as the verdict of a jury upon a
question of fact."32 The same was true concerning admissibility of
unwritten foreign law and construction of a foreign statute. 3 Both
matters, along with how far the cross examination of a witness could
be carried34 and how far the practice of trying collateral issues could
justly and reasonably go,35 Doe said, were questions of fact for the
trial judge. So were the questions whether all or a part only of the
issues in an action should be tried at one time, and which should be
tried first ;26 whether a verdict should be set aside because of excessive
25. Colburn v. Groton, 66 N.H. 151, 153, 28 Atl. 95, 96 (1889).
26. Boody v. Watson, 64 N.H. 162, 186, 9 Atl. 794, 812 (1886).
27. Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N.H. 401, 408 (1872).
28. Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 471, 31 Atl. 900 (1891).
29. Colburn v. Groton, 66 N.H. 151, 153, 28 Atl. 95, 96 (1889); Darling v.
Westmoreland, 52 N.H. 401, 408 (1872).
30. Attorney-General v. Taggart, 66 N.H. 362, 369, 29 Atl. 1027, 1031 (1890).
31. The decision was presaged by a letter he wrote to his closest associate. See
Letter From Charles Doe to William Ladd, February, 1872, in Hening, Charles
Doe, in 8 LEwis, GREAT AMERICAN LAwYERs 241, 259 (1909).
32. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 407 (1869); Colburn v. Groton, 66 N.H. 151,
153-54, 28 Atl. 95, 96 (1889). See also, Holman v. Manning, 65 N.H. 92, 18 Atl.
746 (1889).
33. Jenne v. Harrisville, 63 N.H. 405 (1885).
34. Merrill v. Perkins, 59 N.H. 343, 345 (1879).
35. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Head, 59 N.H. 332, 338 (1879).
36. Owen v. Weston, 63 N.H. 599, 605, 4 Atl. 801, 805 (1885); Bemis v. Morey,
62 N.H. 511 (1883).
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damages 37 or because the finding was against the evidence ;38 whether
a new trial should be granted by reason of newly discovered evi-
dence;39 and whether justice requires a recommittal of a verdict to a
jury and whether justice will result from doing so.40 His whole
purpose was to eliminate burdensome technicalities. An easy way
was to change matters of discretion into questions of fact.
He sometimes went beyond this and used the question-of-fact
approach to overturn doctrines of trial practice which conventional
thought did not regard within the court's discretion. Consider, for
example, how he dealt with the rule that a recorded verdict cannot
be amended by the jury once it has separated. Separation, he ad-
mitted, increased the danger of wrong being done and this raised the
question whether justice required a recommittal of the case for
reconsideration, which in turn raised the second question whether, if
reconsidered and amended, justice required a judgment on the
amended verdict. "Both questions," Doe said, "were matters of fact
to be determined at the trial term."'41 By using the side door provided
by the question-of-fact approach he was able to slip reforms into the
law of practice in a rather painless manner.
The most important series of reforms introduced by Judge Doe had
to do with common-law pleading.42 Based on his belief that procedural
questions are formal, never substantive, they combined a liberal
system of amendments with the principle that every right has a
remedy. Here, too, Judge Doe got extra mileage from the question-of-
fact approach. He had no doubts whatever that the common law
provided a remedy for every right. The court, he said, was duty
37. Merrill v. Perkins, 61 N.H. 262 (1881).
38. Colburn v. Groton, 65 N.H. 151, 154, 28 Atl. 95, 96 (1889) ; Fuller v. Bailey,
58 N.H. 71 (1877). This rule, of course, conflicted with Doe's theory that a de-
cision on a question of fact should never be disturbed. For Doe to hold that it is a
question of fact whether a verdict is against the evidence was an admission that
sometimes the conclusion of the triers of fact could be upset. He made this ex-
ception as narrow as possible by saying:
The question is, whether the conflict between the verdict and the evidence is
so strong that the court can see that the jury, in coming to their result, were
influenced by passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption, or unwittingly fell
into a plain mistake. When there is oral testimony, such a question of fact
should be decided at the trial term by the presiding justice, who, having
heard and seen the witnesses, has much better means of deciding it correctly
than others can have who were not at the trial. And when all the evidence
is in writing, the case falls within the general rule, that questions of fact,
arising at a trial in the trial term, are to be determined there, and not in
the law term. Id. at 71-72.
39. Brooks v. Howard, 58 N.H. 91 (1877).
40. Dearborn v. Newhall, 63 N.H. 301 (1885).
41. Id. at 302-03.
42. Reid, F'rom Common Sense to Common Law to Charles Doe: The Evolu-
tion of Pleading in New Hampshire, 1 N.H.B.J. 27 (April, 1959).
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bound to use the most convenient apparatus of procedure for ascer-
taining and establishing the right and obtaining the remedy, and what
kind of procedure is convenient is a question of fact for the trial
term.'3 He showed how far he was willing to carry this by inventing
a writ for the recovery of a future interest for which equity already
provided a remedy. 4
As for the liberal system of amendments, undoubtedly his finest
achievement as a judge, Doe sought to eliminate technical, justice-
defeating rules of common-law practice by amending mistakes or
omissions, that is, by using amendments to substitute new writs or to
convert an action at law into a suit in equity. The test for permitting
an amendment was the requirements of justice, and whether justice
required an amendment was a question of fact determinable at the
trial term.45 In a typical case, Doe held that when a suit is seasonably
brought, but the writ has been abated because it contained no declara-
tion, the declaration can be amended after the time when a new action
for the same case would be barred by the statute of limitations.
Whether justice requires the amendment is a question of fact."6
Solving the problem of how far to extend these reforms by leaving
each case to be determined on its merits as a question of fact, Doe
bequeathed to New Hampshire the most efficient system of procedure
devised during the nineteenth century and brought about the closest
thing possible to a judicial merger of law and equity. And he did it
without adding new technicalities or refinements as was done in code
states. His method was to turn the law of pleading into a question of
fact.47
He effected a similar revolution in the law of evidence using the
same methods. Considering the premises upon which Judge Doe based
his question-of-fact theory, it is hardly surprising he made legal
presumptions a chief target for reform. For how else would he
characterize a legal presumption but as the failure to draw a line
clearly distinguishing law from fact, that is, a question of fact mis-
takenly held to be a question of law? 4" So determined to weed
43. Metcalf v. Gilmore, 59 N.H. 417, 434 (1879).
44. Walker v. Walker, 63 N.H. 321 (1885).
45. Morgan v. Joyce, 66 N.H. 476, 30 Atl. 1119 (1891); Gagnon v. Connor,
64 N.H. 276, 9 Atl. 631 (1886); Cocheco Aqueduct Ass'n v. Boston & Me. R.R.,
62 N.H. 345 (1882). For amending a suit at law by adding relief in equity see,
Metcalf v. Gilmore, 59 N.H. 417, 432 (1879).
46. Gagnon v. Connor, 64 N.H. 276, 9 Atl. 631 (1886).
47. Interestingly enough, Doe once used the excuse of New Hampshire's easy
amendment procedure to treat as a rule of law a matter he otherwise might have
recognized as a question of fact. Gamsby v. Ray, 52 N.H. 513, 516 (1873).
48. "Among the various ways in which the province of the jury has been en-
croached upon," he said, "the use of legal presumptions as substitutes for evi-
dence, is one of the most conspicuous." Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N.H. 553, 563 (1870).
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legal presumptions from the common law, Doe even overturned one
traceable to the seventh-century code of Ine 4l--that the unexplained
possession of recently stolen goods raised a presumption that the
possessor was the thief. As Doe saw it, presumptions of this nature
should always be treated as questions of fact, not questions of law.
"It is useless," he said, "to call such a presumption a presumption of
law. Call it what we may, it is a presumption of fact."50 Whether a
defendant had possession of stolen goods, and "whether his possession,
if any he had, was recent enough, or exclusive enough, or unexplained
enough, to raise a presumption of guilt,-were questions of fact for
the jury."151
Common-law judges, Doe thought, were fooling themselves if they
believed there could ever be pure legal presumptions. No matter how
much fact they changed into law, there were still factual issues to be
resolved. Even if it were accepted that recent and exclusive possession
of stolen property created a legal presumption of guilt, there would
still be the problem of inventing a rule to determine whether posses-
sion was recent. Surely the question of recentness-of distance in
time-would be oAe of fact under the circumstances,12 so why not be
candid and admit the entire problem properly belongs to the triers of
fact?
Judge Doe carried his dislike of legal presumptions to its logical
conclusion, treating as presumptions problems which many judges
view as merely involving the burden of proof. Here he did some of
his best work,5 3 and again put the question-of-fact approach to effec-
tive use. He even thought the rule shifting the burden of proof on
the party possessing peculiar knowledge of the evidence to be proven
was "an unnecessary transformation of a matter of fact into a matter
of law." Admitting that "obvious impracticability on one side, con-
trasted with obvious feasibility on the other," might "authorize the
invention of an exception to release a litigant from his duty of proving
the essential facts of his case," he showed himself willing to make
the entire law of evidence a question of fact by saying that "the
existence of such impracticability and feasibility, is a question chiefly
of fact." No rule of law had been formulated for the decision of that
question, and even if one had formerly been construed, it would have
49. See, THAYER, A PREImINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE ComoN LAw
327-29, and 328 n.5 (1898).
50. State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 517 (1869).
51. Id. at 526.
52. Id. at 512.
53. Reid, A Speculative Novelty: Judge Doe's Search for Reason in the Law
of Evidence, 39 B.U.L. REV. 321, 328-34 (1959).
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little application now that parties were permitted to be witnesses in
their own actions.54
Turning rules of evidence into questions of fact determinable at
the trial term according to the dictates of justice, enabled Judge Doe
to revitalize the best-evidence rule, freeing it from the technicalities
which prevented triers of fact from hearing certain evidence. His
method is shown by his criticism of the explanation, then currently
accepted, that the reason for excluding evidence was that, as a matter
of law, it could have no bearing on the issue being tried. The correct
rationale, he insisted, was that, "as a matter of fact, it is, under the
circumstances of the case, too remote in point of time or place, or too
insignificant in other respects, to have any proper weight, or to have
any other than a confusing and misleading effect."' 5 From this vantage
point he wrote the "classic" and leading opinion on the admissibility
of collateral evidence,58 later carrying his views to their logical ex-
treme when he said that how far a trial could justly and reasonably
go upon collateral issues, "is often a question of fact.115 Of course,
such problems as the remoteness of evidence were to be treated as
questions of fact 58 and not subjected to confining rules and exceptions.
Still another area in which Doe used the theory of the distinction
between law and fact to bring about a thorough housecleaning of
hoary technical rules and legal presumptions was the construction of
statutes and documents. What he wanted was to re-establish, on a
firm footing, the fundamental principle that the meaning of an
instrument should be determined by ascertaining the intent of the
maker. To Doe this principle had become one of the most glaring
cants in the common law, for while every court claimed to honor it,
few gave it practical meaning. They said they sought the maker's
intent and then determined that intent by applying technical rules of
54. Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N.H. 553, 569 (1870).
The practice of shifting the burden of proof by a legal presumption ...
materially encroached upon the province of the jury, but caused less in-
justice when parties were not allowed the power to testify than it would now.
When courts assumed the power of excluding the testimony of the parties
for reasons alleged to have been satisfactory in a certain state of society,
they did not hesitate, by legal presumptions and other measures, to exten-
sively control the jury in the decision of questions of fact. The tendency in
this state is towards a correction of those errors, and the establishment and
observance of the true line between law and fact, and between the duty of
the court and the duty of the jury. Savings-Bank v. Getchell, 59 N.H. 281,
285-86 (1879).
55. Gregg v. Northern R.R., 67 N.H. 452, 456, 41 Atl. 271, 273 (1893).
56. Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N.H. 401 (1872). For the appellation "classic"
see, 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 458, at 474 (3d ed. 1940); 1 MORGAN, BASIC PROB-
LEMS OF EVIDENCE 172 n.5 (1954).
57. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Head, 59 N.H. 332, 337 (1879).
58. State v. Boston & Me. R.R., 58 N.H. 410 (1878); Hovey v. Grant, 52 N.H.
569, 580 (1873).
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construction which had little to do with what the maker meant and
quite often defeated the very thing he wanted to bring about. Doe
thought the law would be greatly simplified if judges would recognize
that the principle really had two parts-first that any grant, "statu-
tory, contractual, or testamentary," is to be interpreted by ascertain-
ing the intention behind it, and second that "the question of intention
is a question of fact to be determined upon competent evidence."r0
And, as he stressed in decision after decision, he meant exactly what
he said-intention was to be found "by the natural weight of com-
petent evidence proving the fact, and not by artificial and technical
rules." 60 Indeed, Judge Doe once asserted that the overriding neces-
sity of drawing a distinct line between law and fact left him no
alternative except to ignore all rules of construction, even those which
had been sanctioned by centuries of use.,'
An important illustration is his successful attack on the legal
presumption that imputes to every testator full knowledge of law. Not
only does it arbitrarily turn fact into law by determining intent
through legal nomenclature but worse, it makes law "contrary to the
fact. 61 2 Using this argument, Judge Doe accomplished one of his most
cherished objectives and removed from New Hampshire law the re-
maining traces of English legal doctrine inherited from the days when
estates in land reflected feudal theory. Other judges might regard as
substantive law the technical rule that one must use the phrase "and
his heirs" to reserve a fee interest, but not Doe. At most it was a rule
of construction, and a rather bad one at that, since it made the issue
of intent turn on a redundancy only a lawyer could appreciate. It
ignored the factual question, which was whether the grantor intended
to pass full title or only a life estate, by assuming he possessed knowl-
edge of the law, when knowledge or lack of knowledge was perhaps the
best evidence available of his probable intent. Even persons who know
something about law, Doe said, "are not familiar with the relaxed
feudal rule concerning a devise of an estate of inheritance. To apply
59. Burke v. Concord R.R., 61 N.H. 160, 233 (1881).
60. Bodwel v. Nutter, 63 N.H. 446, 448, 3 At]. 421, 422 (1885); see also,
Kimball v. Lancaster, 60 N.H. 264 (1880); Houghton v. Pattee, 58 N.H. 326
(1878). This was one of the very few principles grounded on his question-of-fact
theory in which Doe failed to convince all his colleagues. See Judge Carpenter's
dissent, Stevens v. Underhill, 67 N.H. 68, 73, 36 At. 370 (1883).
61. Kendall v. Green, 67 N.H. 557, 561,42 AtI. 178, 180 (1893).
62. Kimball v. Bible Society, 65 N.H. 139, 149, 23 Atl. 83 (1889). About the
closest Doe came to laying down a rule of law in a will case was his assertion
that a testator has the "right to use what idiom he pleased, and to use it in his
own sense." Sanborn v. Sanborn, 62 N.H. 631, 640 (1882).
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that rule to their wills or deeds is to disregard the evidence of intent
furnished by the probable extent of their information. ' 63
If it had been held that the word "heirs" in a deed, for example,
is necessary in order to convey a fee, it was not because the law
of this state requires the use of the word, but because it was
regarded as competent evidence of the intention of the parties,
and conclusive if not controlled by other evidence. When, how-
ever, it is stated as an unyielding and arbitrary principle of law,
all other evidence is thereby excluded, and it as often operates to
defeat, as to promote and ascertain, the real intention. '
Nowhere else did Doe apply his theory concerning the distinction
between law and fact with more telling effect. Never were his powers
of analysis so strongly evident. Other judges thought they were giving
expression to intention when really defeating it. Mesmerized by
common law habits of thought, they confused fiction with reality.
Using the question-of-fact approach as his lock and key, Doe opened
compartments of the law long since closed. He did not challenge the
importance of the word "heirs." For all he knew it might be the
magic word that proved intent in all cases. But whether it did was a
question of fact determined as other questions of fact, "by the aid of
all competent evidence, and not by the expulsion of evidence otherwise
competent, nor by the mechanical application of antiquated forms of
expression erroneously supposed to express legal principles."65
Had Judge Doe limited his emendation of the law of construction
to exposing musty rules, he might have been less controversial and
gained more proselytes. But he was a man completely sincere in his
institutions and after postulating a legal theory was prepared to
pursue it to the bitter end, regardless of how many would-be converts
he antagonized in the process. What the Chief Justice wanted to
establish was that all instruments should be construed according to
the intention of their makers. The question-of-fact theory was merely
the tool he used to carry it out.
There are few doctrines in the common law more likely to defeat
intention than the rule against perpetuities, though it is so well defined
that it would be extreme tenacity for a judge to question its traditional
application. Yet this is exactly what Doe did in Edgerly v. Barker.
The testator had created a class gift to take effect forty years after
lives in being and the heirs-at-law claimed that since the remainder
could not vest within the period prescribed by law the entire estate
passed as intestate property. This was unquestionably correct and
any court would have declared the will null and void. Any court,
that is, except Doe's. To invalidate the will by a strict application of
63. Smith v. Furbish, 68 N.H. 123, 156-57, 44 Ati. 398, 414-15 (1894).
64. Kendall v. Green, 67 N.H. 557, 559, 42 Atl. 178 (1893).
65. Ibid.
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the rule against perpetuities, he said, might destroy the testator's
intent. What if he had intended the gift to be valid and would have
made it effective in twenty-one rather than forty years had he known
about the rule? This is a question of fact which should be treated
as such and not arbitrarily brushed aside by a rule not designed to
determine intent. "The construction of the will," Doe wrote in the
first sentence of his opinion, "including the question whether the
testator intended the remainder, which he devised to his grand-
children, should vest in them before they became entitled to a distribu-
tion of it, is determined as a question of fact, by competent evidence,
and not by rules of law.16r Even the issue whether the court could
make a division of a defective will was to be settled as a question of
fact by examining the testator's intent. 7 Applying these principles,
Doe concluded that the primary object of the testator was to pass the
property intact to his grandchildren and that the requirement of
forty years was of only secondary importance. Therefore, he held,
"When the youngest of the grandchildren is twenty-one years of age,
the remainder devised to them will be theirs.'"68 A daring decision,
sometimes praised but never followed,60 it at least had the virtue of
accomplishing the chief aim of all Doe's reforms. It left in full force
an established rule of law while nullifying the harshness of its applica-
tion. And it did this by having the extent of its application determined
as a question of fact.
When confronted with doctrines of substantive law, Judge Doe
made almost as wide a use of the distinction between law and fact as
he did in the areas of procedure and evidence. He found it particularly
effective in furthering his efforts to have the norm of reasonableness
recognized as the underlying principle in tort law. Reasonableness
was the legal test, but there was no need to define it-indeed, it
could not be defined-because it was a question of fact for the jury.' °
Doe seems to have been a forerunner of what has been called the most
striking modern development on the allocation of responsibility be-
tween judge and jury in tort cases during the last quarter century-
the trend toward less judicial supervision over jury findings of
negligence. 71 He was prepared to leave negligence pretty much in the
66. Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 447, 31 Atl. 900, 902 (1891).
67. Id. at 472, 31 Atl. at 413.
68. Id. at 474, 31 Atl. at 916.
69. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REV. 638, 649 n.29 (1938).
Also, Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65
HARV. L. REV. 721, 735 (1952).
70. Green v. Gilbert, 60 N.H. 144 (1880); Thompson v. The Androsoggin River
Improvement Co., 54 N.H. 545 (1874).
71. Keeton, Creative Continuity in thp Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. Rav. 463,
503 (1962).
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hands of the triers of fact.7 2 This causes him to appear rather liberal
for his day and age, for it means he removed some of the rigidity
from the law of torts, making it more a matter of degree and giving
it greater flexibility.73
One example may be taken as typical. It stemmed from Doe's
criticism of a Maine case in which the jury was instructed that if a
man starts upon a race, having that object in view, and not any
legitimate purpose of travel, he ceases, as against the town, to have
the rights of a traveller upon the highway; his intention to race,
accomplished by the fact that he was actually started upon the race,
prevents his recovery of damages; it matters not if he starts at a walk,
if he is in the act of racing, the speed at which he is driving is im-
material; his use of the highway for racing is not legitimate. 74 This
was the type of decision which especially goaded Doe. It not only
turned the factual question of reasonable use into a rigid rule of law,
but into a rather harsh one at that, at least when he considered the
infinite variety of situations to which it might apply. By neglecting
the line between law and fact, the Maine court made it difficult to
separate, as a matter of law, fact patterns in which racing or its
equivalent is reasonable from those in which it is not, as for example:
the case of a person who, while out driving for recreation, in-
cidentally, but with a complete racing purpose, puts his horse
to his speed to overtake or pass other teams, and the case of a
person who uses the highway wholly for the purpose of racing.
That the former uses the road for a purpose for which it was
constructed, and the latter does not, may not be a matter of law.
There may be in such cases a question of reasonable use, which
may be a question of fact, on which the court can be required to
decide whether there is any evidence on which it can properly
be found that the use was reasonable. There being no illegal
betting, and mere racing being lawful, and the speed immaterial
on the question of law, it would seem that, whatever differences
of fact may affect the conclusion of fact, the law is the same
whether the match is for running or walking, whether the race
is to the swiftest or to the slowest, and whether the contest is
one of speed or style; and that the point at which such diversions
pass the bounds of legitimate recreation as a proper use of a
highway is to be found by solving the question of reasonable
use as a question of fact.7 5
72. Huntress v. Boston & Me. R.R., 66 N.H. 185, 191, 34 Atl. 154, 156 (1890).
73. Compare, for example, Doe's decision in the Huntress case (Ibid.), with
that of Justice Holmes in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S.
66 (1927). Both cases involved accidents at railroad crossings. Holmes established
a hard, fast rule and took issue of due care from the jury. Doe not only made it a
jury question but probably also thought that what constitutes due care was a
question of fact.
74. The case was McCarthy v. Portland, 67 Me. 167 (1878).
75. Varney v. Manchester, 58 N.H. 430, 437 (1878).
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Some New Hampshire lawyers thought Doe's annoyance with
precedents like this Maine case-precedents which turned fact into
law-had led him too far in the opposite direction. His young as-
sociate, Frank N. Parsons, was one. Appointed just ten months before
Doe died, Parsons came to the bench determined to oppose what
seemed to be Doe's policy of letting every tort case go to the jury. He
began writing opinions, notable for their argumentation of factual
questions, in which he required that the plaintiff produce substantial
evidence before the lower court could submit the case to the triers of
fact. Apparently reacting to Doe, Parsons employed the principle that
every plaintiff must prove his case in tort as well as in contract, to
reverse what he and the bar believed was an overemphasis on the
question-of-fact theory.7 6
While it is true that Doe extended the area of liability by freeing
issues such as causation from appellate review, 77 Parsons and his
followers were mistaken if they believed he was looking toward the
day when it would be a question of fact whether any given action
constituted a tort. After all, Doe wrote Brown v. Collins 7 81-the deci-
sion considered to have turned the tide against the doctrine of absolute
liability in American common law-in which he certainly intended
to lay down a rule of law taking from the jury the question whether
fault is necessary to sustain a cause of action. On other occasions he
permitted the issue of liability to be taken from the jury.70
If Parsons misunderstood Doe's objectives he can hardly be blamed.
Others have as well, including John Chipman Gray, George F. Hoar,
and practically every recent writer on the law of criminal insanity.
Their misunderstanding was of a different kind, however, and prob-
ably resulted from considering only a single opinion without ap-
preciating the intricate common-law theory which the Chief Justice
constructed during thirty-five years on the bench. His continual harp-
ing on the question-of-fact theme, in decision after decision, caused
local lawyers such as Parsons to think it the main object of his re-
forms rather than the tool. He probably wanted them to, for it kept
their attention focused on the means rather than the ends and per-
mitted him to effect changes in substantive law which appeared not
too radical when viewed as part of the question-of-fact pattern. But
76. Brown, Remreks, 5 PRoc. N.H. BAR Ass'N 162, 166 (1924). For one of
Parsons' earliest decisions taking a tort case from the jury see, Burham v. Con-
cord & M. By., 63 N.H. 567,44 Atl. 750 (1896).
77. Three cases typical of Doe's tort theories are: Huntress v. Boston & Me.
R.R., 66 N.H. 185, 34 Atl. 154 (1890); Squires v. Young, 58 N.H. 192 (1877);
Underhill v. Manchester, 45 N.H. 214 (1864).
78. 53 N.H. 442 (1873).
79. E.g., Morse v. Boston & L. R.R., 66 N.H. 148, 28 Ati. 286 (1889) ; Knowl-
ton v. Pittsfield, 62 N.H 535 (1883).
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out-of-state lawyers who did not regularly read the New Hampshire
Reports approached his opinions from a different vantage point. To
them the substantive innovation loomed large, while the question-of-
fact theory seemed just an isolated argument thrown in to lend
historical probity to a questionable departure from precedent.
Surely no one suffered greater shock reading a Doe opinion than
did John Chipman Gray when he read Edgerly v. Barker. In a blister-
ing, bitter article, calculated to draw blood, he criticized it from every
angle and denounced it on every conceivable ground. Yet, when he
came across the question-of-fact argument as it related to giving
expression to the testator's intent-the very heart and motivating
force of Doe's decision-he dismissed it with the words, "This mode
of expression is peculiar to the learned court."8 ' He either had become
weary of encountering it in Judge Doe's decisions or else he had
decided that it was merely a smoke-screen sent up by Doe to cover
his real purpose. In any event, Gray considered it of little importance
and readers, relying on his summary, never got a complete idea of
what the Chief Justice was actually saying. Since the article has been
reprinted in every edition of Gray's treatise, it meant most American
lawyers have depended on his presentation.
If Professor Gray believed Doe employed the question-of-fact ap-
proach primarily as an excuse for rewriting substantive law to suit
himself, without conviction of the theory's intrinsic worth, he was
mistaken. Judge Doe was so unequivocably committed to the principle
that the distinction between law and fact forms the mainspring of the
common-law system, that he lost few opportunities to expound his
theory, often with a crusader's zeal. This was another reason he
sometimes was misunderstood, as illustrated by the Mink Case.-1 It
was a relatively unimportant decision in which Doe held that a
statute, prohibiting the killing of minks, could not constitutionally
apply in a situation where the owner of geese acted in defense of his
property. Researching the matter, Judge Doe concluded that English
courts, concerned about the use of "spring-guns, man-traps, or other
engines calculated to destroy human life or inflict grievous bodily
harm," had unsuccessfully turned fact into law by trying to formulate
legal rules for determining the reasonable necessity of such devices
under varying circumstances. They so bungled the job that Parlia-
ment had stepped in and straightened out the mess by passing rules
of its own. Doe, who disliked statutory interference with the com-
mon law, thought this a classic example proving the folly of changing
fact into law:
80. Gray, General and Particular Intent in Connection With the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 9 HARv. L. REv. 242, 243 (1895).
81. Aldrich v. Wright, 53 N.H. 398 (1873).
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If the courts had refrained from the invasion of the province of
the jury, it would not have been necessary for the legislature to
make this imperfect restoration of the common law, or to provide
penalties for its violation. If the reasonable necessity of employ-
ing defensive machinery of all kinds had been left to the jury, as
such a question of fact should have been, much judicial and
legislative trouble would have been avoided, and the general
principles of the common law would have been sufficient. The evil
effects of holding fact to be law, practically demonstrated in this
branch of the doctrine of defence, should operate as a warning
against similar mistakes.8 2
Aroused by this legislative interference with the common law, necessi-
tated by the failure of English courts to draw a clear line between
fact and law, Doe set about writing a treatise on the problem, in which
he attempted to re-establish basic principles and keep American courts
from following the English precedents. The quantity, quality, and
time of justifiable defensive action, he asserted, depend upon the
reasonable necessity of each case, and what is a reasonable necessity
is determined as a question of fact according to the particular cir-
cumstances. To demonstrate the soundness of this principle, he
ridiculed the absurdity of one English rule, relied on by counsel, that
the defendant would have been unjustified in killing the minks if his
geese were not in imminent danger, that is if he could have driven
them away or frightened off the minks without harming them. 13 This
led Doe into a rather facetious discussion of the reciprocal rights,
duties, and liabilities of owner, geese, and minks. To one unfamiliar
with Doe's reforming zeal, his devotion to the purity of the common
law, and his belief in the distinction between law and fact, his purpose
could be easily misunderstood. When President Arthur was wavering
between appointing Doe or Horace Gray to the United States Supreme
Court, Senator Hoar called the general frivolity of the Mink Case to
the attention of the Senate as proof that Doe was not fit for the post.
Considering his interpretation, it made effective ammunition. 4
Critics like Professor Gray and Senator Hoar, who dismissed the
question-of-fact approach as unimportant, hardly worried Judge Doe.
He did not mind if men disagreed with him. But he was sorely
82. Id. at 404-05.
83. Doe said the jury question was "not whether [the defendant] . . . could
have driven [the geese] away from the minks, but whether [the shooting] ...
was reasonably necessary for the protection of his property, considering what
adequate and economical means of permanent protection were available, the legal
valuation of vermin life, and the disturbance and mischief likely to be wrought
upon his real and personal estate if . other than a sanguinary defence were
adopted." Id. at 423.
84. Reid, Of Men, and Minks, and a Mischievous Machinator, 1 N.H.E.J. 23
(Jan. 1959).
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troubled when he found they had missed his message altogether; that
by heeding only his unprecedented results, they had neglected his
arguments. During his lifetime he saw this happen to what today
is the most controversial of all his pronouncements, the New Hamp-
shire doctrine of criminal insanity. He had grounded it squarely on
the distinction between law and fact, yet courts and commentators
had universally accepted it as a medical attack on the traditional
tests for insanity rather than a positive pronouncement of common
law principles. This was partly Doe's fault. His usual habit, when
using the question-of-fact route to reform a rule of law, was to say
he had no quarrel with the old rule, as long as its probative value was
recognized as properly belonging to the province of the jury. For all
he knew the rule might be a correct test of the facts. In this way the
Chief Justice softened the impact of innovation by tinting the rule
with the stigma of having disrupted the common-law system by
usurping the province of the jury.
But when he ran up against the right-wrong test for criminal
insanity Doe became so convinced of its basic unsoundness, in fact
as well as law, that he wrote a commentary on its psychiatric fallacies.
This was a mistake, for it led observers to believe he was endorsing
as a law, counter-theories which he really was making questions of
fact.85 After waiting twenty years Judge Doe complained, somewhat
bitterly, that despite the many things written about his insanity
doctrine, "I have seen nothing that can be regarded as a serious effort
to grapple with the argument of the common law question."'' 6
He would have been amazed had he lived to see what happened after
1954, when the District of Columbia court formulated the Durham
rule and said, gratuitously, that it was "not unlike" the New Hamp-
shire doctrine.8 7 Writer after writer, and decision after decision,
accepted this inaccurate statement as true, and the New Hampshire
doctrine has become inseparably associated with the Durham rule and
has been forced to share the blame for all the faults that Durham
spawns. This is erroneous. The Durham rule and the New Hampshire
doctrine of criminal insanity are not the same and, at the very most,
are only distantly related.88 Indeed, as far as Doe is concerned,
Durham and the right-wrong test are the twins, since both are guilty
85. See e.g., Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. C:i. L.
REv. 367, 870 n.12 (1955).
86. Letter from Charles Doe to Clark Bell, Jan. 10, 1889, in Bell, Editorial:
The Right and Wrong Test in Cases of Homicide by the Insane, 16 MEDIco-LFGAL
J. 260, 263 (1889).
87. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
88. Reid, Understanding the New Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity,
60 YALE L.J. 367 (1960).
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of the same fundamental error-both confuse fact with law by turning
contemporary medical theory into legal dogma.
Anyone who takes the trouble to read the opinions by Judge Doe,
giving birth to the New Hampshire doctrine, will find them classic
expressions of the question-of-fact approach. The M'Naghten rules,
the irresistible-impulse test, and all other formulae for determining
criminal insanity, he says, are not doctrines of substantive law. At
best they are legal presumptions which invade the province of the
jury by turning questions of fact into matters of law 9 His two
opinions contain all the premises upon which he vested the question-of-
fact theory: the idea that there is a basic unity to the common law
which can best be maintained by adhering to fundamental principles
such as the distinction between law and fact;5O the argument from
history that the formulation of insanity tests was originally a question
of fact which had been mistakenly turned into a rule of law during
the epoch when courts forgot their proper function;"1 and the con-
clusion that error had been perpetuated by false precedents 2 leading
to results which call the common-law process into question. 3 The
89. Consider, for example, how he dealt with the irresistible impulse test:
It was, for a long time, supposed that man, however insane, if they knew
an act to be wrong, could refrain from doing it. But whether that supposi-
tion was correct or not, is a pure question of fact. The supposition is a
supposition of fact,-in other words, a medical supposition,-in other words,
a medical theory. Whether it originated in the medical or any other pro-
fession, or in the general notions of mankind, is immaterial. It is as medical
in its nature as the opposite test.
State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 437 (1869) (concurring opinion).
90. He first formulated the New Hampshire doctrine in a probate case, insisting
that the test for capacity to make wills and the test for criminal accountability
were the same-both are questions of fact. Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 120,
140 (1865) (dissenting opinion). In that case the jury was instructed that "de-
lusion" was the test for capacity. Doe said:
The question whether Miss Blydenburgh had a mental disease was a ques-
tion of fact for the jury, and not a question of law for the court. Whether
a delusion is a symptom, or a test, of any mental disease, was also a question
of fact, and the instructions given to the jury were erroneous in assuming
it to be a question of law.
Id. at 147-48.
91. Without any conspicuous or material partition between law and fact,
without a plain demarcation between a circumscribed province of the court
and an independent province of the jury, the judges gave to juries, on ques-
tions of insanity, the best opinions which the times afforded. In this manner,
opinions purely medical and pathological in their character, relating entirely
to questions of fact, and full of error as medical experts now testify, passed
into books of law, and acquired the force of judicial decisions. Defective
medical theories usurped the position of common-law principles.
State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 438 (1869).
92. Id. at 432.
93. It is the common practice for experts, under the oath of a witness, to in-
form the jury, in substance, that knowledge is not the test, and for the judge,
not under the oath of a witness, to inform the jury that knowledge is the test.
And the situation is still more impressive, when the judge is forced by an
impulse of humanity, as he often is, to substantially advise the jury to acquit
the accused on the testimony of the experts, in violation of the test asserted
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correct view, Doe said, is to recognize that judges have no business
declaring which factual test is correct. The whole difficulty with the
law of criminal insanity, he concluded, is that "courts have under-
taken to declare that to be law which is a matter of fact.94 Few
decisions rest so solidly on the distinction between law and fact, yet
none has been so universally misunderstood by commentators.
One reason may be the very expression "question of fact." Other
courts feel they make "insanity" a question of fact when they limit
the jury's role to determination of whether the defendant suffered
from certain prescribed symptoms of sickness. To Doe this is laying
down a rule of law-a legal presumption-to solve a matter properly
within the province of the triers of fact. When he said insanity is a
question of fact, he meant that it is for the jury to determine, without
judicial interference, according to the circumstances of each case,
whether the defendant is insane. This includes deciding what is the
definition of insanity and whether a causal relationship between
disease and act has to be established. It is little wonder his decisions
have been misread. By using the English language in a literal sense,
he sowed the seeds of confusion, forgetting that lawyers are educated
to legal fictions of phraseology. Twenty years after he wrote his
insanity opinions, Doe wished he could rewrite them.
These things are minor, however. What really counts are the
reforms which he accomplished by using the question-of-fact ap-
proach. It would be impossible to say what was more important to
him, the immediate reforms or the general need to re-establish the
distinction between law and fact. Perhaps in Edgerly V. Barker the
common-law argument, as it related to finding the testator's intent,
was more motivating than any desire to remodel the rule against
perpetuities. With the New Hampshire insanity doctrine, however,
it is possible that dissatisfaction with the right-wrong test weighed
more heavily, and the question-of-fact theory was only the means to
an end. It does not really matter. What is unique is the formulation
and the use. Only an acute scholar of the common-law process could
have formulated the theory. Only a master of the common-law tech-
nique could have used it to filter so many otherwise unrelated rules
and principles.
Many other judges have shared Charles Doe's desire to reform law
by eliminating harsh rules and abolishing unnecessary technicalities.
Yet few brought about even a fraction of the reforms which Doe
by himself. The predicament is one which cannot be prolonged after it is
realized. If the tests of insanity are matters of law, the practice of allowing
experts to testify what they are, should be discontinued; if they are matters
of fact, the judge should no longer testify without being sworn as a witness
and showing himself qualified to testify as an expert.
Id. at 441.
94. Id. at 442.
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accomplished. Lacking his genius and insight, they did not appre-
ciate the need to master the more pedestrian tools in the common-law
arsenal. Where he used the question-of-fact approach to outflank an
entrenched legal dogma which he wished to reform, they would con-
duct frontal assaults and were driven back far short of their goals.
Many besides Doe knew what causes had to be fought, but he found
a more effective means of fighting. Instead of placing their preci-
sian colleagues on the defensive by contending that inferences, pre-
sumptions, and rules of construction should be treated as questions
of fact, these others would offer alternative inferences, presumptions,
and rules of construction. Alternatives based on notions of justice
drawn from the factual circumstances of particular cases are not
likely to sway judges devoted to stare decisis. Chief Justice Doe never
debated facts with his colleagues. He knew it would be a waste of time.
One of the advantages to the question-of-fact argument, as pre-
viously suggested, was the way Doe used it to skirt the problem of
persuading other New Hampshire judges that the rule he wanted re-
formed was unreasonable. He often ducked the problem by admitting
it was perfectly reasonable-as fact but not as law. 5 This is shown
by his treatment of the knowledge tests for criminal insanity. Even
though he made it quite clear he thought them bad medicine, he never-
theless insisted he found no fault with them as definitions. They
"fairly and properly" describe the mental phenomena they are used
to depict, he conceded. 6 "Whether the old or new medical theories
are correct," however, "is a question of fact for the jury; and it is
not the business of the court to know whether any of them are cor-
rect. ' 97 It was for those who wished to preserve the rules he chal-
lenged to prove them matters of law. Doe was not going to debate
their merits.
When championing a reform, the Chief Justice tried to avoid antag-
onizing the vast army of nineteenth-century lawyers who made stare
decisis their motto. He did this by squeezing another advantage out
of the question-of fact approach. He used the historical premises on
which he based it to pose as a conservative while acting radically. By
claiming he was restoring the common law to its historical purity as
it had been before English judges overstepped themselves and began
confusing fact with law, he could argue that the rule he was trying
to reform had erroneously been slipped into the law by courts which
95. E.g., Doe thought the presumption of guilt raised by recent and exclusive
possession of stolen property was probably reasonable, but its existence as a pre-
sumption was a question of fact for the jury. State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 526
(1869).
96. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 433 (1869).
97. Id. at 438.
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exceeded their authority. This was one way Doe abrogated words of
limitation. They had, he said, been introduced by a judicial exer-
cise of legislative power.98 He anticipated the charge that he himself
was guilty of legislating by saying that rules of construction had
originally been questions of fact. To change them into matters of
law by making them legal standards for proving intent, was a legis-
lative rather than a judicial function.9 9 The onus was on the de-
fenders of precedent to produce an act of Parliament or prove his
historical theory incorrect. It was he who was the conservative by
re-establishing a fundamental principle of the common law.
Finally, Judge Doe found the question-of-fact argument handy
for side-stepping altogether the problem of precedent. Labelling as
questions of fact matters usually treated as within the court's discre-
tion or as questions of law, he was able to ignore precedents which
called them "presumptions," "rules of construction," "discretion,"
and so on. This was more than a switch in terms, for the implication
was that courts which did not call them questions of fact had un-
doubtedly committed error. "A single precedent of a matter of fact
turned into law," he warned, "is a dangerous thing where precedent
is authority."'100
The very fact that precedent was so highly regarded as authority
during the second half of the nineteenth century may be one reason
why Judge Doe relied on the question-of-fact approach to effect his
reforms. He did not forget that the history of the common law has
been a struggle to balance stability with expansion. Since the current
price for rejecting precedents was to turn law into fact, he willingly
tipped the scales in favor of expansiol. Doe knew this could bear
heavily on defendants in tort cases, yet he insisted that wrong done in
the decision of questions of fact could not "be legally prevented or
rectified by a judicial alteration of the law."101 To any criticism that
he was extending liability, he would have replied that he was merely
restoring to the jury its original functions. 102
98. Sanborn v. Sanborn, 62 N.H. 631 (1882).
99. Kendall v. Green, 67 N.H. 557, 560-61, 42 Atl. 178, 179 (1893).
100. Gray v. Jackson & Co., 51 N.H. 9, 37 (1871).
101. Huntress v. Boston & Me. R.R., 66 N.H. 185, 192, 34 Atl. 154, 157 (1890).
102. The leading critic of the question-of-fact approach was Justice Holmes.
Perhaps his best analysis of its faults was given in an address delivered three
years after Doe's death. Holmes believed that the jury had no historic right to
decide standards of conduct. Although the theme of his paper was that history
should be used to expose false explanations of legal rules in the way in which Doe
excelled, he did not mention Doe's historical theory concerning the distinction be-
tween law and fact. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REV.
443 (1899); HoLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLEcTE LEGAL
PAsER5 210, 232-38 (1921).
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Judge Doe gave the same answer to the charge that he was making
law uncertain and unpredictable by depriving it of the convenience
of uniform rules. 0 3 He sought reasonableness ahead of certainty,
even in business transactions, 11 yet realized the latter's importance.
He thought that if jury verdicts "seem to be sufficiently settled and
invariable" this would answer the contention that questions of fact
had to be changed into questions of law for the sake of expediency
and convenience. °5 He probably knew this was none too convincing,
for he also put his case on the more solid footing of constitutional
principle. Any argument that the law has to be certain, Doe said,
"must be sparingly used in a jurisdiction in which the subject has
been placed upon the high ground of a constitutional duty which
renders a careful distinction between law and fact a vital part of
trial by jury," even in criminal cases.0 6 "If trial by jury is as val-
uable as it seemed to the founders of our institutions, the danger of
holding a matter of fact to be a matter of law outweighs the incon-
venience of any uncertainty likely to be produced by verdicts of
juries. ... "107
Nor would the Chief Justice have agreed that he was avoiding
difficult legal details by turning them into questions of fact, or, con-
versely, that he was giving jurors matters which were too difficult
for them to solve. To Doe, the true beauty of the common law was
that it did not burden itself with details or try to solve every fact
pattern in advance. If, he once wrote, the trend favoring questions
of fact over questions of law made the law "still more simplified,"
then "the profession would be relieved and justice promoted."10
Any fear of making things too difficult for the triers of fact, Doe
thought, was no excuse for neglecting the distinction between law
and fact. "It is," he said in his criminal-insanity decision, "often
difficult to ascertain whether an individual had a mental disease, and
whether an act was the product of that disease; but these difficulties
arise from the nature of the facts to be investigated, and not from
the law; they are practical difficulties to be solved by the jury, and
not legal difficulties for the court." 0 9
It has been said that Judge Doe was so anxious to turn law into
fact, he sometimes forgot that many matters contain mixed questions
of law and fact. But criticism of this sort usually came from lawyers
103. Gray v. Jackson, 51 N.H. 9, 36-37 (1871).
104. The proper exercise of corporate powers, for example, he held a question
of fact. Burke v. Concord R.R., 61 N.H. 160, 244 (1881).
105. Gray v. Jackson & Co., 51 N.H. 9, 36 (1871).
106. State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 524 (1869).
107. Gray v. Jackson & Co., 51 N.H. 9, 37 (1871).
108. State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 526 (1869).
109. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 438 (1869).
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who disagreed with his conclusions or misunderstood his aims. Of
course, his use of the expression "questions of fact" to describe
what others called "judicial discretion" caused some confusion. So
too did contemporary New Hampshire law, which tended to lean
heavily on the factual side, leaving out-of-state readers of Doe's
opinions with the impression he had not considered the possibility
that the rule which he was discussing might combine both law and
fact.11° Although not always as explicit as he could have been, he
usually gave the question some attention. He seems to have viewed
it as a kind of clinical problem, in which the actual dividing lines
could be determined only after examining the facts. As he put it,
"Many questions of combined law and fact cannot be answered with
legal precision until their component parts are separated, and the
facts are found." 1, Here again he shied away from laying down
rigid legal tests and thought solutions could rest on the circumstances
of each case. When forced to admit that a question was properly
a matter of law for the court, Doe tried to retain what flexibility
he could by introducing as much fact as possible. Thus he held that
while the construction of a bond is a matter of law, and not a mat-
ter of fact, "it is to be determined, like a question of fact, by the
weight of the competent evidence contained in the bond and other
writings, and not by any technical rule of law.""12
It would be hard to say just where Doe would have drawn the
line favoring fact over law. Constitutional matters he certainly
thought were not questions of fact. 1 3 He said, for example, that
the extent of legislative power was a question of law."14 In at least
one case the two most conservative members of the court dissented
when he held that the application of a statute was a matter of law.
They thought it a question of fact."5 This may offer one explana-
110. Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 609, 2 So. 854, 874 (1887) (dissenting
opinion).
111. Dow v. Northern R.R., 67 N.H. 1, 6, 36 Atl. 510, 512 (1887).
112. Houghton v. Pattee, 58 N.H. 326 (1878). Also, Sanborn v. Sanborn, 62
N.H. 631, 643 (1882).
113. Of course, the construction of the Constitution by finding the makers'
intention was to be effected as a question of fact and not by technical rules. Hale
v. Everett, 53 N.H. 9, 133 (1868) (dissenting opinion).
114. Dow v. Northern R.R., 67 N.H. 1, 54, 36 Atl. 510, 537 (1887).
115. Doe ruled that plaintiff, who worked to repair defendant's mill on a
Sunday, could not sue on the contract because of a Sunday blue law which per-
mitted only those repairs on Sunday "in mills and factories which could not be
made on a week-day without throwing many operatives out of employment."
Carpenter and Blodgett, JJ., dissented. They were "of opinion that the question
whether the plaintiff's labor was a work of necessity is a question of fact, and
that no reason of convenience or expedience requires it to be treated as a ques-
tion of law." Hamilton v. Austin, 62 N.H. 575, 576 (1883).
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tion why Judge Doe encountered little opposition from his colleagues
on the question-of-fact theory. It had already obtained a respecta-
ble place in New Hampshire practice by the time he adopted it as
his chief tool for reform.116 Once the members of the court recovered
from the initial shock of his unorthodox views,117 he had little diffi-
culty getting them to think in terms favorable to questions of fact.
It is still the hallmark of New Hampshire's jurisprudence; perhaps
the chief legacy Doe left to the bench and bar of his state. Some,
like Parsons, questioned the indiscriminate extension of the theory,118
but almost invariably they went along with their Chief Justice.
It was in this manner-by using the distinction between law and
fact as his leverage-that Judge Doe was able to influence many
different areas of adjective and substantive law, and win a place
in legal history alongside Lemuel Shaw and John Bannister Gibson.
They left their mark by speaking for prestigious courts, on im-
portant matters often of first impression. He did it by finding a
simple, unifying principle, which permitted him to reform seemingly
unrelated legal rules, eliminate long-established technicalities, and
introduce flexibility and degree to previously rigid law. Indeed, it
was the question-of-fact doctrine which first brought Judge Doe to
national attention. 19 He knew he was in the vanguard of a trend.
"We are," he wrote, "consciously moving against a great current of
authority, towards a trial by jury in which the jury shall be the
judges of fact as fully and completely as the court are the judges
of the law."120
His belief that the distinction between law and fact was the
neglected principle underlying the common-law system seems hardly
novel. But it was in the practical application of theories that Judge
116. At least Judge Doe said he was following theories laid down in Pitkin v.
Noyes, 48 N.H. 294 (1868) ; State v. Bartlett, 43 N.H. 225, 232 (1861) ; Pierce v.
State, 13 N.H. 536 (1843). The first two decisions were written by Judge Bellows
and it is difficult to say whether he influenced Doe or was influenced by Doe.
Compare, Hays v. Waldron, 44 N.H. 580 (1863), with Green v. Gilbert, 60 N.H.
144 (1880).
117. In the first two cases in which Doe tried to establish his question-of-fact
theory, his views were rejected. Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 120 (1866);
Kendall v. Brownson, 47 N.H. 186 (1866). Doe's dissents in both of these cases
were later adopted by the whole court.
118. As in will cases where Blodgett warned it could "inevitably incite litiga-
tion" and "produce infinite uncertainty and delay in the settlement of estates."
Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N.H. 475, 498, 3 Atl. 604, 616 (1886). Doe took no exception to
this when he wrote Blodgett his views on the draft opinion. See, Reid, Doe Did
Not Sit-The Creation of Opinions by an Artist, 63 CoLum. L. Rsv. 59, 68-69
(1963).
119. Note, Province of Court and Jury, 6 ALBANY L.J. 269 (1872).
120. State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 526 (1869).
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Doe excelled. The idea that through it he could unify the common
law is proof of his originality. Yet here he sometimes let theory
dominate practice, as when he concluded that testamentary capacity
and criminal responsibility present similar legal problems since
both involve the issue of mental derangement, the definition of which
should be a question of fact; or that the test of a criminal confes-
sion and an admission of civil liability can be simplified into a com-
mon pattern since they raise the same factual issue.1 2, The discovery
that he could reform so many substantive and procedural technicali-
ties by using this one unifying theory as a reagent to bring fresh
methods of analysis to bear on some of the common law's most en-
trenched doctrines, is proof of his genius. Still it is these decisions,
where much of Doe's fame rests, which have been most frequently
misunderstood or undervalued.
It has been suggested that Chief Justice Doe's desire to abolish
common-law technicalities "was founded on his confidence in jury
trial.' 122 This puts the cart before the horse by confusing the means
with the end. The means, or the tool, was the distinction between law
and fact. The jury system was only incidentally the beneficiary of the
application of the tool. The ultimate end which he sought was the
abolition of technicalities. He utilized the jury so that "the experi-
ence, intelligence, and judgment of twelve men may be availed of to
settle disputed questions of fact."' 23 If during the thirty-five years he
was on the bench the jury's province was enlarged, it was not because
he had inherent faith in their experience, intelligence, and judgment,
but rather because it was a natural consequence of extending the area
of fact while contracting the area of law. Judge Doe was prepared to
set aside a verdict contrary to evidence,124 because he knew jurors are
fallible,12 5 and to exclude some matters from jury consideration, be-
cause he knew the probativeness of questions of fact has limitations.26
It was not that Doe admired the jury; he detested legal technicalities.
The furthest Chief Justice Doe went towards giving the jury any
consideration in justifying the question-of-fact theory was when he
121. Colburn v. Groton, 66 N.H. 151, 158 (1889). Cases cited note 32 supra.
122. Note, Doe of New Hampshire: Reflections on a Nineteenth Century Judge,
63 HARV. L. REV. 513, 516 (1950).
123. Huntress v. Boston & Me. R.R., 66 N.H. 185, 189, 34 Atl. 154, 156 (1890).
124. Colburn v. Groton, 66 N.H. 151, 28 Atl. 95 (1889).
125. While the law does not and cannot prescribe the weight to be given to
the evidence bearing on a question of fact, it does not tolerate wild, erratic,
fanciful, or distorted views. It can lay down no absolute rule for ascertain-
ing what property is worth, because that is a question of fact; but it requires
that question to be decided by a fair exercise of the common sense of an
honest an [sic] intelligent man.
Cocheco Mfg. Co. v. Strafford, 51 N.H. 455, 481 (1877).
126. Gregg v. Northern R.R., 67 N.H. 452, 454, 41 Atl. 271, 273 (1893).
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remarked that adherence to the line of demarcation between its
province and that of the court, would be "a practical improvement,
tending to facilitate the study and administration of the law, and to
make it a more intelligent and rational system of general rules-a
point of no small consequence in a society which undertakes to found
its institutions upon popular intelligence."' 12 7 The jury was important,
true enough, but the main thing was to make the law an intelligent
and rational system. The distinction between law and fact was the
principle which had to be restored to its central place in the common
law, because neglect of it in the past had caused legal fossilization.
This was his theory and his purpose. It lay at the heart of all his
reforms and at the same time explained those reforms, because if it
had not been forgotten or ignored there would have been no need to
reform the law.
The simple, plain, methodical, and sensible system of the com-
mon law, is composed of a few elementary principles. To these
have been added presumptions, exceptions, fictions, and refine-
ments, excessively multiplied and extended in intricate and at-
tenuated forms, with a great amount of fact wrongfully con-
verted into law. The labyrinth of authority, already vast and
dark, and rapidly growing vaster and darker, is beginning forci-
bly to suggest the necessity of recurring to fundamentals. If
some of the skill exercised in inventing special and exceptional
rules, and changing presumptions of fact into presumptions of
law, were used in following general principles in their full
operation and complete development, distinguishing between
law and fact, submitting questions of fact to the jury, and clear-
ing the law of the mass of fact with which it is now encumbered,
it might be more easily and thoroughly understood and more
rationally and justly administered. And it may be well to con-
sider precedent more natural and logical, less artificial and inco-
herent in vindication of the claim that the law is a science and
the perfection of reason.22
Professor Gray was wrong about Judge Doe's use of the question-of-
fact theory. It was more than a peculiar mode of expression.
127. State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 524 (1869). Doe also said:
In usurpations, the jury do not meet the court upon equal terms, and the
court must be equally sensitive, whether it is their own province, or the
province of the jury, that is encroached upon.
Ibid.
128. Libon v. Lyman, 49 N.H. 553, 571 (1870).
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